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News
STRONG TANKER MARKET EXTENDS PEAK SEASON 
EARNINGS
The Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) 
reported that tanker earnings for crude oil tankers have risen 
to new strong levels in the first quarter of 2015, with averages 
unparalleled since 2008. The demand for crude oil tankers 
remains high even though the winter months are far behind us. 
Following the winter peak season of 2013/14, crude oil tanker 
earnings collapsed and remained low during spring, before 
rebounding over the summer. This was not the case in the winter 
peak of 2014/15. The market appears to have kept momentum, 
keeping the crude oil tanker earnings at a high level. The average 
VLCC earnings were around $51,000 per day in the first quarter of 
2015,  i. e. 76 % higher than in the first quarter of 2014, when they 
averaged to approximately $29,000 per day. This also applies to 
Suezmaxes earnings, which amounted to around $50,000 per day 
in 2015 and around $31,000 in 2014. Although the difference was 
not as large in the Aframaxes, it was still noticeable with around 




STOWAWAYS: THE HIDDEN TRUTH?
The IMO has recently released its annual statistics for stowaways 
in 2014. The headline figures could provide a good news headline, 
‘A 40 % decrease in reported stowaway incidents in 2014’, but is 
this really the case?
It is difficult to believe that, considering mass, irregular migration 
around the world, in particular from North Africa across the 
Mediterranean, only 120 cases were reported worldwide in 2014, 
which is a 40 % decrease from the 203 reported in 2013. I suppose 
this could be seen as a good news story and an argument that 
security has improved in all ports, thus deterring people from 
attempting to embark on ships in an unconventional manner. 
However, the report only takes into consideration caught 
or identified stowaways, not their total number. How many 
stowaways actually managed to evade capture? We are unlikely 
to ever know the real numbers but with the record levels of 
illegal migration from Africa witnessed in 2014[1], and a reported 
reduction in stowaway numbers, this rather than being good 
news suggests that incidents were almost certainly not reported 
or security at the ports failed to stop them.
It is difficult to estimate the exact number of incidents that have 
gone unreported, or the number of stowaways who successfully 
completed their journey undetected. The IMO’s stowaway 
report for 2008 set a high point of 494 incidents and 2052 actual 
stowaways, i.e. seven times of what was reported in 2007 and 
twice as many as reported in 2009. However, none of the reports 
attempts to explain the spike. Is it just an anomaly? Has security 
at ports really improved so much since 2008 that these irregular 
migrants dare not risk being caught on board a merchant ship 
while accepting the possibility of death in the Mediterranean? 
Has the security situation in Africa or the Middle East improved so 
much that there is no need for these methods of illegal migration, 
or do the 2008 figures represent a closer approximation to the 
actual numbers of stowaways? Unfortunately, we are unlikely to 
ever know the actual numbers involved.
Maritime security is at the heart of this issue. Instead of being 
political or economic migrants, these stowaways could be As published in the https://www.bimco.org.
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Figure 2.
Irregular migration numbers source.
Source: http://www.dryadmaritime.com.
terrorists attempting to gain access to western countries by less 
protected routes. The Islamic State has already made its intention 
to use the irregular migrant routes in the Mediterranean to enter 
southern Europe clear. What is to stop them from attempting to 
do so as stowaways? Until we have clear reporting and a better 
understanding of the problem, it is likely that ports, and some 
shipping companies, will ignore it. There should be no stigma 
attached to being recorded in the IMO’s stowaway statistics 
since this represents a demonstrable success on the part of the 
shipping companies and ports which cought them, rather than 
let them slip away. The question is, ‘are we seeing the full scale 
of the problem or is the truth, like the stowaways, hidden from 
our view?’
As published in the http://www.dryadmaritime.com
MARITIME CRIME FIGURES FOR Q2 2015
The following narrative accompanies Dryad’s maritime crime 
figures for Quarter 2 (April to June) of 2015, assessing the 
situation across our main areas of maritime interest. The report is 
not limited to traditional piracy and maritime crime, but includes 
commentary on other threats and issues; from civil war and 
terrorism in Yemen and Libya to criminal gang-enabled mass 
migration – areas and issues upon which we report regularly to 
our clients. The narrative, compiled by Dryad’s regional analysts, 
is set against a highly visible, complex and dynamic international 
backdrop.
Southeast Asia 
There has been a 22 % increase in reported incidents across 
Southeast Asia in comparison with the first six months of 2014; 
120 instances of piracy and maritime crime have been reported to 
Dryad. 12 vessels were hijacked in the first half of the year; which 
is a three vessel increase in comparison with the same period last 
year. The purpose of ten of these hijacks  was cargo theft, eight 
of which were successful; MT Sun Birdie and MT Orkim Harmony 
were both recovered with their cargo intact. The boarding and 
subsequent robbing of vessels transiting the Singapore Strait 
continued apace with 48 vessels reporting incidents in the first 
six months of the year, which is a 118 % increase from the 2014 
figures. The most significant decline in incidents was in the 
anchorages to the east of the Singapore Strait. While 18 vessels 
were boarded in the area in the first six months of 2014, only 
five were boarded in the same period of this year. The robbing 
of vessels at anchor around Southeast Asia continues, with most 
cases occurring in Bangladesh and Vietnam.
The arrest of two groupus of hijackers in the first six months of 
the year will likely result in the declining number of hijackings of 
small, local product tankers in the area. However, this will almost 
certainly be just a temporary setback for the crime syndicates 
which appear to be able to evade arrest and recruit new members 
to carry out the actual attacks. Dryad expects to see a resumption 
of attempted hijacks in July.
With little apparent evidence of coordinated security patrols 
of the Singapore Strait by the three surrounding nations, the 
criminal gangs who board passing vessels are operating almost 
with impunity, sometimes boarding three vessels a night. The 
vast majority of these boardings take place in the eastbound 
Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) between Pulau Karimun Kecil 
and Pulau Besar. Until effective patrols are put in place these 
crimes will almost certainly continue.
Indian Ocean 
There have been no incidents of piracy across the HRA in Q2. 
The last confirmed vessel to have been fired upon by suspected 
Somali pirates in the Indian Ocean HRA was in February 
2014. Interestingly, there have been only six advisory notices 
promulgated by the UKMTO in Q2, and only one of these has 
been in the BaM/Southern Red Sea. This sudden reduction in 
suspicious incident reports coincides with the intervention of 
the Saudi led coalition in Yemen. The only confirmed reports of 
maritime crime were four cases of robbery; three from vessels at 
Kandla, India and one in Mombasa, Kenya. These incidents were 
carried out by opportunistic local criminals and have no links to 
Somali piracy.
The civil war in Yemen is still raging with daily airstrikes by 
coalition aircraft on Houthi positions. In the Gulf of Aden, the port 
city of Aden is one of the most violent areas, with rival factions 
fighting intensely over large areas of the city. Vessels attempting 
to dock at Aden have been fired upon with rockets and shells 
and the refinery at Aden was hit and reported to be burning out 
of control. Despite being in Houthi hands, the Red Sea ports of 
Hodeidah and Saleef continue to operate. All vessels heading 
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for these ports are required to have the appropriate permissions 
to arrive there; on approach, they are stopped and searched by 
Saudi and Egyptian warships with any non-conformity resulting 
in the vessels being denied entry to the ports.
During Q2, three vessels were harassed, with two being fired 
upon by Iranian military vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. One 
vessel, MV Maersk Tigris, was arrested and forced to sail to Bandar 
Abbas where she was anchored under Iranian control for nine 
days before being released. The Iranian authority’s rationale for 
this arrest was an unpaid bill from over 10 years ago. However, 
in the week prior to this incident, a convoy of Iranian vessels 
heading towards Yemen, and suspected of delivering supplies 
to the Houthis, was intercepted by US naval forces and forced to 
turn back to Iran.
The Southwest Monsoon has now taken hold of the Somali Basin/
Arabian Sea and will continue through to mid-September. During 
this period, sea conditions will be outside of limits of operation 
of small crafts. There is very little opportunity for Somali pirates 
to operate in open ocean areas during the Monsoon. Conditions 
within the Gulf of Aden and the Southern Red Sea will, for the 
greatest part of this period, be within limits of pirate operations, 
but there are no current indicators suggesting the resumption of 
pirate activity.
Gulf of Guinea 
In April and May, at least 20 mariners were taken from five 
vessels off the shores of Rivers and Akwa Ibom States in Nigeria. 
Kidnapping of crew for ransom still remains the most significant 
threat to seafarers in the region. Given the historical frequency 
of attacks off Bayelsa State, Nigeria, it is somewhat surprising 
that there has been only one attack offshore this year, with none 
occurring during this last quarter. Dryad believes it is only a 
matter of time before attacks on a range of commercial shipping 
resume in this area, with the prime motive of crew kidnapping 
for ransom.
There have been no incidents of cargo theft in West Africa since 
MT Mariam was hijacked off the coast of Warri on 11 January. 
This form of piracy in the region has reduced in frequency since 
two tankers were hijacked in June and July 2014 off the coasts of 
Ghana and Togo. That said, as the risk of attack remains a very real 
one, there should be no room for complacency amongst product 
tanker operators.
Overall, there have been 16 confirmed incidents reported in the 
second quarter of 2015 compared to 18 in the first quarter, and 
15 in the same period last year – records of Dryad’s reportable 
incidents in the Gulf of Guinea are generally consistent with the 
number of recorded incidents in previous years.
Mediterranean 
The extremely unstable political and military situation in Libya 
continues, affecting adjacent countries as well as normal shipping 
and trading operations, as is the continuing humanitarian crisis 
of Mediterranean migration emanating from Libya and other 
countries.
Oil export remains of critical importance to Libya’s economy 
and continued fighting seriously affects the country’s ability to 
maintain its finances. It was anticipated that Q2 would see this 
improve, but the hopes that Ras Lanuf and As Sidr would reopen 
have not yet been realised and these oil export terminals remain 
closed to tanker traffic. UN sponsored talks in Morocco are at a 
critical juncture with both sides meeting for face to face talks at 
the end of the period. The acceptance of the negotiated plan will 
hopefully reduce the level of violence but, as with any similar 
agreement, it is only the continued acceptance by the lowest 
level of fighters on all sides that will prevent the re-ignition of 
violence.
Further attacks on merchant ships in the vicinity of the Libyan 
coast have occurred following the attack on MT Araevo on 4 
January. MV Tuna 1 and MT Anwar Afriqya were both attacked in 
May, in waters off Derna and Sirte, respectively.  More recently, an 
unconfirmed report suggests that a probable fishing vessel was 
attacked off Benghazi in June.
In Q2, the Islamic State has had mixed success in establishing itself 
in Libya. While it had some success in Sirte, it appears to have been 
ejected from Derna. Its reach has expanded to adjacent countries 
with the attacks in Tunisia on both the Bardo Museum in March 
and on the beach in Sousse being claimed by IS affiliated groups. 
Despite the indirect maritime nature (cruise ship passengers and 
beach hotel victims), there is insufficient evidence for Dryad to 
change its previous opinion that the terrorist threat to transiting 
merchant traffic is low.
The risk to foreigners ashore in Libya, however, remains high 
throughout the country, with visiting workers in danger of 
inadvertently being caught up in the heavy fighting ashore, as 
well as facing the threat of kidnap. These conditions mean that 
vessel crews are strongly recommended not to leave the confines 
of the terminals and ports they work in.
On migration, the recent UN report stating that over 137,000 
migrants crossed the Mediterranean in the first 6 months of the 
year compared to only 75,000 in the same period last year further 
highlighted the scale of the humanitarian crisis. The European 
Unions’ efforts to deal with the problem have not yet been fully 
approved by the United Nations. However, additional Coastguard 
and Naval vessels are operating in the area alongside charities, 
such as Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS), in an attempt to 
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prevent the loss of life seen earlier this year. Despite these efforts, 
commercial vessels are still being engaged in rescue operations 
involving large numbers of migrants. There are also threats to 
navigation in the transit areas as traffickers act covertly with unlit 
boats at night. 
Latin America and the Caribbean  
Reports of robbery from sailing vessels and anchored merchant 
vessels have reduced from 10 in Q1 to four in Q2. Two of these 
were robberies from sailing vessels at anchor and two from MVs 
at anchor. There is a threat to sailing vessels throughout the 
Caribbean. Yachts anchored in exposed bays are targeted due to 
the perception that the owners are wealthy and carrying large 
amounts of cash. These attacks commonly see the use of extreme 
violence with knives and guns often used. Despite the continued 
uncertainty in Venezuela, there have been no instances of crime 
reported against MVs in the country’s ports. Ports in Brazil, Peru 
and Colombia have seen robbery from vessels at anchor and 
alongside in the recent past. Sensible security measures should 
be put in place when operating in these areas.
As published in the http://www.dryadmaritime.com
RISING FROM THE ASHES
The federal government is now taking steps to reverse its 2010 
decision to terminate the nation’s LORAN program. The LORAN 
program was initiated during World War II, when US and Allied 
forces fighting in the Pacific Theater needed a good means of 
navigation in that vast ocean. The US Coast Guard was charged 
with establishing and operating chains of Loran-A stations 
throughout the Pacific. With the war’s end, the program was 
extended to coastal areas of the United States and elsewhere. 
Over time, Loran-A was replaced by Loran- C, which provided both 
greater coverage and improved accuracy. As part of the digital 
revolution, the Coast Guard began exploring the possibility of 
developing an enhanced version of Loran in 2000, soon referred 
to as eLoran. In an effort to reduce the hemorrhaging federal 
deficit, the Administration’s Budget for 2010 proposed the 
termination of the Loran program, using these terse words: “The 
Budget also supports the termination of outdated systems such 
as the terrestrial-based long-range radionavigation (LORAN-C) 
operated by the U.S. Coast Guard resulting in an offset of $36 
million in 2010 and $190 million over five years.” Although only 
the bean counters thought this was a good idea, the Department 
of Homeland Security and the U.S. Coast Guard bit their respective 
tongues and went along, as did the Congress. Thus, Loran-C was 
terminated as was the work on the development of eLoran. 
Similar to Loran-A and Loran-C, eLoran is a low-frequency 
terrestrial navigation system utilizing a number of transmission 
stations emitting a precisely timed and shaped radio pulses. In 
eLoran, the pulses are centered at 100 kHz. Each station emits a 
sequence of eight pulses spaced 1000 microseconds apart. The 
stations are grouped into chains, each consisting of one master 
station and two or more secondary stations. The master station 
transmits first, followed by successive transmissions from each 
of the secondary stations in the chain. The master/secondary 
transmission sequence is repeated periodically, with the period 
between repetitions referred to as the Group Repetition Interval 
(GRI). Unlike the hyperbolic Loran-C system, modern eLoran 
receivers can simultaneously measure the “time of arrival” of 
signals from many stations in multiple chains. Using solid-state 
transmitters and atomic clocks, eLoran provides extremely 
accurate timing. The transmitters also provide a data channel 
carrying correction and integrity messages. Using built-in 
microprocessors, eLoran receivers output latitude and longitude 
directly, eliminating the need for Loran-line charts. The eLoran 
system operates in much the same way as GPS or other global 
navigation satellite systems (GNSS), but as a complementary 
and independent system. There are no failure modes in common 
with GNSS systems. Operating at significantly higher power than 
satellite-based systems, eLoran is much more difficult to jam or 
spoof. Since at least 2004, studies have pointed out the nation’s 
(and indeed the world’s) increasing reliance on GPS and other 
GNSS for positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT). Surveyors, 
farmers, and others rely on GPS to accomplish many of their 
tasks. Modern transportation networks rely on GPS for their 
operation and safety. Modern communication, financial, and 
power networks could not operate without the precise timing 
provided by GPS. Of the 16 commercial sectors identified as vital 
to the nation’s economy, security, and health – referred to as 
critical infrastructural sectors – at least eleven rely extensively on 
GPS. GPS technology and GPS-supported applications are deeply 
embedded into the fabric of our modern lives. Computers, 
cellular telephones, automatic teller machines (ATMs), and 
electronic chart display and information systems (ECDIS) would 
all cease to operate properly without the PNT output available 




development and is highly vulnerable. Solar flares and other 
high-energy electromagnetic fields (natural or man-made) can 
temporarily or permanently disrupt transmissions.
Terrestrial or airborne transmitters can jam or block reception of 
satellite signals over wide areas. Due to the lower power of the 
satellite signals, receivers can be spoofed or fooled into accepting 
and utilizing bogus signals.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that there 
are significant concerns about the sufficiency of efforts of the 
critical infrastructure sectors to mitigate the anticipated adverse 
effects of GPS signal loss. Other studies have shown that the only 
reasonably available mitigation technology to address GPS signal 
loss is Loran.
The federal government seems to be finally awaking from its 
self-induced slumber on this vital issue. On 23 March 2015, the 
Department of Transportation (DOT) published a notice seeking 
public comments regarding potential plans by the government 
to implement eLoran as a complementary PNT capability to 
GPS. On 27 March, representative John Garamendi (D-CA) 
presented the bipartisan National Positioning, Navigation, and 
Timing (PNT) Resilience and Security Act of 2015 (H.R. 1678). 
If enacted into law, the bill would require the Secretary of 
Defense, in coordination with the Commandant of the Coast 
Guard and the Secretary of Transportation, to provide for the 
establishment, sustainment, and operation of a reliable, land-
based positioning, navigation, and timing system to provide a 
complement to and backup for GPS, to ensure the availability 
of uncorrupted or non-degraded PNT signals for military and 
civilian users if GPS signals are corrupted, degraded, unreliable 
or otherwise unavailable. The General Lighthouse Authorities 
of the United Kingdom and Ireland (GLA) have never given up 
on eLoran. Rather, since 2007 they have constructed transmitter 
sites and conducted tests at sea to determine the accuracy and 
robustness of the system. In partnership with other European 
nations, there are now nine operational transmitters providing 
coverage for northwest Europe. The Russians have converted 
their Chayka radionavigation system to broadcast a signal that 
is compatible with eLoran. Only time will tell if the legislative and 
executive branches of the federal government have the political 
will to move forward on this vital and long overdue initiative. The 
technology is readily available, but it will take determination to 
make these first tentative steps a reality. Scarce funds will have to 
be appropriated. Priorities will have to be rearranged. While the 
government has imposed a number of resilience requirements 
on the private sector, it has omitted to take an important step 
of its own. Measures are being taken to rectify that oversight. 
In mythology, the phoenix is a long-lived bird that is cyclically 
regenerated or reborn. A phoenix obtains new life by arising from 
the ashes of its predecessor. The allusion fits the situation with 
Loran. Loran-A gave birth to Loran-C. After its death, Loran-C may 
be about to give birth to eLoran.
THREATS TO GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE SYSTEMS
Originally developed to guide Allied convoys safely across the 
Atlantic, the use of synchronized low frequency radio signals as 
a navigational aid revolutionized modern maritime navigation 
in the 1940s. Faced with operating ships and aircraft over vast 
areas, researchers pioneered the use of radio signals to aid 
navigation in regions where poor weather conditions made 
traditional methods—such as dead reckoning and celestial 
navigation—exceptionally difficult. This system was eventually 
named LORAN. When in range of three or more shore-based 
transmitters, LORAN receivers placed onboard ships and aircraft 
allowed operators to fix their location within minutes regardless 
of the weather. The original system, known as LORAN-A, and 
its eventual replacement, LORAN-C, were operated by the U.S. 
Coast Guard and other nations until  2010. The U.S. portions of 
the system were phased out in favor of the satellite-based Global 
Positioning System (GPS) which became operational in July 1995. 
The latest LORAN Position Navigation and Timing (PNT) system 
known as “eLoran” is currently in use or under consideration in 
several countries. Eventually, Loran C systems throughout the 
world are expected to be replaced by eLoran. The impact of GPS 
on the commercial transportation industry has been enormous. 
Everything that moves—ships, cars, trains, aircraft, and even 
farm equipment—is now navigated by GPS, or a similar GNSS 
system. Companies worldwide use GPS to time- stamp business 
transactions, maintain records, and ensure traceability. Major 
financial institutions use GPS to synchronize their computer 
networks around the world. Large and small businesses now 
use automated systems which can track, update, and manage 
multiple transactions made by a global network of customers. 
These systems require accurate timing information available 
through GNSS Systems such as the GPS (National Coordination 
Office for Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing, 
2014).
The commercial maritime industry has become especially reliant 
on GNSS technology. eCharts provide a continuous, real time plot 
of the true and relative movements of both the vessel and nearby 
objects, often using radar images and Automatic Information 
System (AIS) transponder signatures superimposed on the 
electronic chart (see Figure 1). Most merchant marine academies 
continue to teach their cadets skills such as how to fix a vessel’s 
position using terrestrial and celestial bearings. However, these 
techniques are less frequently used in the modern shipping 
industry, which continues to move irreversibly towards the use of 
fully integrated electronic bridges. 
Yet, in the event of a GNSS compromise, these basic seaman skills 
may be necessary to counter a cyber attack. Several other satellite-
based PNT systems are also in operation. In 1995, the same year 
that GPS became operational, the Russian Federation announced 
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the deployment of the GLONASS. This system has been hampered 
by uneven funding and suffered a well-publicized 11-hour service 
outage in April 2014, among other failures. In Asia, China plans 
to deploy its BeiDou-2 (formerly known as COMPASS) satellite 
navigation system. The BeiDou-1(BDS) system currently provides 
only regional coverage, however China has announced plans to 
provide global coverage by 2020. In Europe, the European Space 
Agency (ESA) continues with the development of the Galileo 
satellite navigation system. When complete, Galileo will provide 
low precision PNT services to the general public, while high 
precision services will be available for a fee to commercial and 
military subscribers.
Figure 4.
Sample eChart. (Ship Technology Global, 2014).
Figure 5.
GNSS frequencies, including Radio Navigation Satellite 
Service (RNSS); and Aeronautical Navigation Satellite 
Service (ARNS) frequencies. (MicrowaveJournal.com May 
2012).
GNSS Signals produced by PNT satellite systems range between 
1162 and 1610 MHz (see Figure 2). U.S. GPS emits two types 
of signals: one which is broadcast on a single frequency and 
available free to all users; and second which is broadcast on a 
separate encrypted frequency available only to the military. 
These two signals, are equally accurate. However the availability 
of the second signal on a different frequency allows the military 
to compensate for naturally occurring interference within the 
ionosphere, resulting in a more accurate fix and greater system 
resiliency. It is important to note that GNSS pulses are extremely 
weak. GPS signals have been compared to the light emitted by 
a “40 Watt light bulb as seen from 11,000 miles away (17,700 
km)” (Daniels, 2014). As such GNSS signals are vulnerable to: (1) 
jamming and interference - the broadcast of a stronger signal 
that intentionally or unintentionally blocks or impacts a GNSS 
satellite signal; (2) spoofing - the broadcast of a false GNSS signal, 
but of a slightly greater power which deceives the GNSS receiver 
into locking onto the spoofed signal. A spoofing attack can be 
very difficult to detect.
(3) meaconing - the intentional delay and re-broadcast of a GNSS 
signal intended to introduce error into receivers;  
(4) Extreme Space Weather (ESW) - solar activity such as solar 
flares, coronal mass ejections, high-speed solar wind, and the 
impact of energy particles on the earth’s ionosphere. 
(5) other vulnerabilities - kinetic or laser attacks on satellite 
constellations or collisions with space debris are only a couple of 
the other known susceptibilities of the GNSS. Shipboard Systems 
Affected by the Loss of GNSS Signals – a significant portion of 
navigation equipment on the bridge of a modern ocean- going 
commercial vessel (see Figure 3) and various offshore energy 
platforms will likely be affected by the loss of GNSS signals. For 
the components listed above, the loss of GNSS may not prevent 
the component from functioning through an alternate sensor 
input. However, tests conducted by the General Lighthouse 
Authorities (GLA) of the United Kingdom and Ireland in 2008 
showed how easily error messages and auditory warnings 
prompted by the loss of the GPS can distract (and overwhelm) a 
vessel’s bridge team (Grant, Williams, Ward, & Basker, 2008). This 
can be especially dangerous for vessels operating in confined 
waterways, near shallow areas, or maneuvering in higher traffic 
densities.
These vulnerabilities are not unique to the maritime industry. 
A number of other industries are also at risk. For instance, the 
aviation and financial industries are heavily dependent on 
properly functioning PNT systems and would be affected in 
varying degrees by a cyberattack on the GNSS. Largely unique 
to the maritime industry however, is that much of marine 
environment information transfer is via radio frequency (RF) 
and not a dedicated hard-line network or directional microwave 
dish. A good example of this type of transfer are positioning 
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Figure 5.
Maritime navigation equipment that use GPS as a data 
input. (Grant, Williams, Ward, & Basker, 2008).
Figure 7.
Coverage area of the GPS jamming unit at 25m above 
ground level on maximum power of 1.58W ERP. (Grant, 
Williams, Ward, & Basker, 2008 - Image courtesy of DSTL).
Figure 6.
Small jammers that can be purchased via the Internet.
Source: U.S. Government
signals emitted by satellite systems. Data being sent to and from 
shipboard computers along with other shipboard technology 
are cyber; therefore interference with the data flow constitutes a 
cyber threat. Ergo, a Maritime Cyber Security (MCS) issue.
GNSS Jamming Equipment
With some exceptions, the use of GNSS jammers is generally 
illegal in the U.S., Canada and Europe. Despite this, jammers of 
various sizes and power ratings (see Figure 5) are available via the 
internet. These small handheld jammers are extremely difficult to 
locate and suppress for law enforcement officials because they 
can be used intermittently, disguised or hidden easily, are highly 
mobile, and if necessary disposed of quickly by perpetrators. 
Advanced GPS receivers are more resistant to jamming than 
conventional designs. For example, receivers equipped with 
nulling antennas are more resistant to jamming than receivers 
without them (Jones, 2011). Figure 5 shows the area affected by a 
GPS jammer during tests conducted at Bridlington, U.K. along the 
coast of the North Sea in 2008. During the test, a jamming unit 
was positioned 25m above ground, with the maximum power 
of 1.58 watts. These tests demonstrated that relatively small 
jamming units can effect GNSS reception over great distances 
(Grant, Williams, Ward, & Basker, 2008).
Threat Scenarios
At this time, the three most likely GPS maritime cyber threat 
scenarios to consider are:
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Figure 8.
Location of North Korean Jammers.
•	Jamming	of	a	port	or	other	congested	waterway	by	an	individual	
or a small group of non-state actors using small, portable 
jammers. 
Rapid movement of these individuals, coupled with intermittent 
use of the jammer(s) would make it very difficult for local law 
enforcement officials to track and arrest the perpetrators quickly. 
Attacks of this type can result in significant economic losses, as 
well as loss of confidence by system users. 
•	State-sponsored	GNSS	Jamming.
The best documented examples of state-sponsored jamming 
attacks occurred in the Republic of Korea (see Table 1). On three 
different occasions, the Republic of Korea was subjected to 
intentional, high-power jamming by North Korea over a wide 
area. The source of these attacks appear to have been large 
truck-mounted jamming units placed at strategic geographical 
locations (Figure 6). Amongst many attacks, the 2012 attack 
affected over 1000 aircraft and 250 ships (Seo & Kim, 2013).
•	State-sponsored	Spoofing.
Eventually, spoofing may pose a significant maritime threat to 
GNSS as it has the potential to lead vessels astray into dangerous 
waters, resulting in significant loss of life (cruise liners and ferries) 
or environmental damage. Presently, spoofing requires a level 
of technical sophistication that is normally presented through 
nation states. However, small groups have conducted successful 
spoofing tests, most notably students of the University of Texas 
under Professor Todd Humphreys.
Primary Defenses Against Jamming
•	Improved	Maritime	Training	and	Education.	
Ship crews should be taught how GNSS systems interact with 
shipsystems and how to recognize when GNSS signals may 
have been compromised. The maritime industry should also be 
encouraged to maintain basic seamanship skills, such as dead 
reckoning and the ability to use piloting instruments. Routine 
ship drills should include signal loss and spoofing of the signal.
•	 Improved	Equipment.	The	development	of	new	GPS	receivers	
capable of identifying non-GPS signals by their relative location 
(jamming and spoofing signals come from terrestrial locations 
not satellites) and strength (jamming and spoofing signals must 
by necessity be stronger than GPS satellite-generated signals). 
In addition to receiver signal strength alarms and specialized 
antennas, the effects of intentional jamming could be mitigated 
through the use of inertial navigation systems (INS) and Inmarsat 
offers radio frequency (RF) jamming detectors. However, at the 
moment, it is unclear when such equipment will be available to 
and employed by the commercial industry, or how much it will 
cost.
•	 Installation	of	Powerful	Alternate	Ground	Based	PNT	Systems.	
Coastal nations most at risk should consider the installation of 
alternate (back-up) or complementary, land-based PNT systems, 
such as enhanced LORAN (known as eLoran).
Rather than purely “back-up”, it is “complimentary” in that the low 
frequency of the powerful eLoran signals permits PNT reception 
in GNSS denied environments. However, the main benefit of such 
systems is to provide PNT users with a second and more resilient 
PNT signal – one that is too powerful to be effectively jammed 
or spoofed. 
Recommendations
Worldwide dependence on Global Navigation Satellite Systems 
(GNSS) continues to grow. Ongoing advancements in jamming 
technology and the availability of small, portable jammers 
constitute a significant threat to maritime commerce and safety. 
In the face of a GNSS jamming attack, most commercial ports 
could be forced to suspend operations until the source of the 
interference is located and suppressed. It is very possible that 
a group of individuals operating small, portable jammers could 
force the closure of a major seaport or international maritime 
chokepoint. The economic consequences of such an attack 
could amount to billions of dollars. In the long-term we also 
anticipate that more powerful jamming technology and delivery 
systems (such as broadband jammers and drones) will become 
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Table 1.
Intentional High-Power Jamming of Korea.
Source: Maritime Reporter & Engineering News, May 2015.
Figure 9.
Caterpillar.
CATERPILLAR CONTINUES TO BE SUCCESSFUL IN DUAL 
FUEL ENGINE RETROFITS, SUPPLIES COMPLETE GAS 
SYSTEM FOR FUER WEST TANKER 
Hamburg, Germany – Building on the success of recent MaK 
diesel engine dual fuel retrofit conversions, Caterpillar Marine 
is currently underway on another dual fuel engine retrofit 
conversion onboard the 472 foot Fure West tanker, owned by 
Furetank Rederi A/B. The MaK™ M 43 C diesel engine onboard 
the tanker will be retrofitted in hull, in the 7 cylinder M 46 dual 
fuel platform, with each cylinder offering 900 kW of rated power. 
Additionally, Caterpillar is also supplying the complete gas 
system for the tanker, including bunker stations, 2x LNG tanks 
measuring 4.15 meters by 24 meters and the vaporizer.
This project, backed by the European Union and developed with 
the Zero Vision Tool, will mark the second MaK engine dual fuel 
retrofit. In 2014, Caterpillar successfully completed the dual fuel 
engine retrofit conversion on the Anthony Veder Coral Anthelia 
LNG carrier. “We’re pleased to continue to build upon our 
successful track record of dual fual conversions in the commercial 
marine industry and offer an increased scope of supply to our 
customers,” Finn Vogler, Caterpillar Marine senior engineer 
noted. “We have a market-ready technology available that our 
commercial marine customers can be completely confident in 
and after our success onboard the Coral Anthelia, we have seen 
the demand for MaK dual fuel solutions increase substantially.”
With a bore of 460 millimeters and stroke of 610 millimeter, the 
M 46 dual fuel engine was designed for electric drive propulsion 
systems as well as mechanical propulsion systems. Although 
designed for unlimited operation on LNG, marine diesel oil and 
heavy fuel oil, the M 46 DF will reach industry-leading efficiency 
in gas mode. The M 46 DF was strategically engineered to allow 
for the retrofitting of current M 43 C engines. Additionally, 
existing M 32 E engines can be retrofitted into the MaK M 34 DF 
dual fuel platform. As a result of the synergies between the two 
platforms, Caterpillar can perform in hull retrofit conversions 
without having to move the engine block or perform extensive 
machining. Cat dealer Pon Power had a significant role in the Fure 
West conversion. “We’re able to differentiate our solutions in the 
market by offering a collaborative partnership with our dealers 
to ensure the retrofit conversions are completed in an expedited 
manner and with a reduced number of parties involved as a result 
of our ability to provide the complete gas system for a vessel as 
well,” Vogler noted.
About Caterpillar Marine
Caterpillar Marine, with headquarters in Hamburg, Germany, 
brings together all the marketing and service activities for Cat 
and MaK™ marine diesel, dual fuel and gas power and propulsion 
systems within Caterpillar Inc. The organisation provides premier 
power solutions in the medium- and high-speed segments with 
outputs from 93 to 16,800 kW in the main propulsion and 10 to 
16,100 kWe in marine generator sets, as well as a comprehensive 
portfolio of propulsion solutions. The sales and service network 
includes more than 2,100 dealer locations worldwide dedicated 
to providing support to customers in ocean-going, commercial 
marine and pleasure craft wherever they are.
widely available and constitute two of the greatest threats 
to GNSS. The maritime community needs to become more 
vigilant, actively train to recognize and respond to cyber attacks 
including jamming and spoofing, and encourage the immediate 
installation of complementary PNT systems such as eLoran in 
strategic maritime locations.
As published in the May 2015 edition of Maritime Reporter 
& Engineering News - http://magazines.marinelink.com/
Magazines/MaritimeReporter
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Figure 10.
Upcoming IMO III emission regulations,selected 
operation profi les and diesel fuel costs make the M 46 DF 
a preferred engine regarding lowest cost of operation..
Source: www.wartsila.com.
About Caterpillar
For nearly 90 years, Caterpillar Inc. has been making sustainable 
progress possible and driving positive change on every 
continent. Customers turn to Caterpillar to help them develop 
infrastructure, energy and natural resource assets. With 2014 sales 
and revenues of $55.184 billion, Caterpillar is the world’s leading 
manufacturer of construction and mining equipment, diesel and 
natural gas engines, industrial gas turbines and diesel-electric 
locomotives. The company principally operates through its three 
product segments - Resource Industries, Construction Industries 
and Energy & Transportation - and also provides financing and 
related services through its Financial Products segment. For more 
information, visit caterpillar.com. To connect with us on social 
media, visit caterpillar.com/social-media.
Power Range  5400-8100 kW  
Engine Specifications
Speed Range  500-514 rpm
Emissions  IMO II
Aspiration  Turbocharged
Bore  460.0 mm
Stroke  610.0 mm
Rotation (from flywheel end)  Counterclockwise / Option for 
Clockwise
Configuration  Inline 6,7,8,9
Dimensions & Weights
Minimum Dry Weight  94000.0 kg
Minimum Length  8271.0 mm
Maximum Length  10528.0 mm
Minimum Height  5130.0 mm
Maximum Height  5501.0 mm
Minimum Width  2878.0 mm
Maximum Width  2878.0 mm
Benefits & Features 
Related Products 
DNV GL’S UNMANNED FLNG CONCEPT BOOSTS SAFETY 
AND REDUCES COSTS
DNV GL has developed a new unmanned floating LNG concept 
that overcomes many of the challenges currently faced by those 
looking to unlock the potential of remote offshore gas fields. 
Called Solitude, the concept demonstrates how technological 
advances – most of the technology already within reach — can 
be combined into a solution offering a 20 percent reduction in 
annual OPEX, adding only a few percent increase in CAPEX and at 
the same time increasing the overall safety. 
FLNG technology is developing rapidly as part of the industry’s 
quest for resources in more remote waters. A number of 
concepts have been discussed, but only a few are currently under 
construction, as many oil and gas companies have experienced 
double-digit growth in both capital and operational expenditure 
over the last decade. 
Foreseeing the need for more remote projects to be able to 
overcome even more challenging cost barriers, whilst still meeting 
increasingly stringent safety and environmental standards, DNV 
GL embarked on an Extraordinary Innovation Project to explore 
the future of LNG technology.     
“Solitude has been developed with maintainability foremost in 
mind,” says Elisabeth Tørstad, DNV GL CEO Oil & Gas.  “By changing 
the focus from maximum efficiency to maximum reliability, and 
selecting robust processing options with built-in redundancy, we 
were able to develop a solution that ensures production levels 
and boosts the economic viability of FLNG projects.” 
Solitude makes use of advanced but widely available technology 
to provide its power. Power that would otherwise be generated 
by high-maintenance gas turbines can, for example be generated 
by fuel cells. This improves power generation reliability and 
reduces the unit’s environmental footprint. 
Equipment throughout the FLNG is modularised and monitored 
from shore with much of the routine maintenance and fault 
elimination being carried out by self-programming autonomous 
inspection and maintenance units (robots). The topside has a 
system of rails that run along each process train, providing these 
robots with access to all equipment. 
Wireless sensor networks act as eyes, ears and noses, feeding 
information to a condition monitoring system that overseas fault 
detection, proactive maintenance and repair planning. 
As there will be no one living on board or working on the topside 
during normal operation, the associated personal safety risks are 
eliminated. When people enter for extensive maintenance works, 
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the topside would be prepared as a safe working environment. 
A new support and accommodation vessel concept and its 
associated docking system on FLNG further boost the safety of 
interventions. 
“Existing frontier oil and gas projects have resulted in tremendous 
technological developments, particularly in the subsea 
realm, and Solitude draws on this,” says Tørstad. “Operators 
are already controlling subsea installations and simple, fixed 
offshore installations from shore. Given the on-going advances 
in autonomous systems and remote operations, unmanned 
offshore installations are a natural development over the next 
few decades.” 
“While Solitude is a holistic concept, many of its solutions can be 
implemented independently – and some are already available 
today. These projects are our way of thinking out loud. Our 
aim is to present high-level concepts that can form a basis for 
discussion and be further developed in collaboration with the 
industry. We see Solitude as a new opportunity for the future,” 
ends Elisabeth Tørstad. 
DNV GL’s Extraordinary Innovation Projects are part of the 
organization’s commitment to provide foresight into the future. 
Five percent of the company’s revenue is invested in research and 
development.
About extraordinary innovation 
Innovation starts with understanding the current situation, 
being open-minded, learning from others and playing with 
ideas. In DNV GL’s Extraordinary Innovation Projects, we use this 
approach to take a fresh look at the industries we work with and 
the challenges they face. Our aim is to inspire our stakeholders to 
think differently and support the development of safer, smarter 
and greener solutions to their problems.
About DNV GL 
Driven by its purpose of safeguarding life, property and the 
environment, DNV GL enables organisations to impove the safety 
and sustainability of their business. We provide classification 
and technical assurance services, along with software and 
independent expert advisory services to the maritime, oil & gas 
and energy industries. We also provide certification services to 
customers across a wide range of industries. Operating in more 
than 100 countries, our 16,000 professionals are dedicated to 
helping our customers make the world safer, smarter and greener.
As published at https://www.dnvgl.com/news/dnv-gl-
s-unmanned-flng-concept-boosts-safety-and-reduces-
costs-24193
IS MARITIME SIMULATION THE SOLUTION TO 
MARITIME CYBER SECURITY THREATS
The U.S. Executive Branch has declared the cyber threat one of 
the most serious economic and national security challenges 
we face as a nation, and that America’s economic prosperity in 
the 21st century will depend on effective cyber security. Before 
the maritime industry sounds the danger signal, it needs to 
monitor other industries and branches of the government and 
take proactive preventative measures. There is no better place 
to prepare future and current mariners for these challenges than 
maritime simulators. 
Cyber Security 
Cyber security refers to the technologies and processes designed 
to protect computers, networks and data from unauthorized 
access, vulnerabilities and attacks via the Internet by cyber 
criminals. The advent of computers, network devices and 
telecommunications capable of transporting data via radio 
frequency, opened up a whole new world of vulnerabilities to 
hackers wishing to tap, steal, destroy or alter data. It ushered in a 
new era of potential maritime threats that go well beyond physical 
piracy such as the Maersk Alabama. With the recent GPS spoofing 
of a yacht by students of the University of Texas, the maritime 
sector has entered into a new arena which must be addressed 
as Maritime Cyber Security. In early 2013, the U.S. Executive 
Branch, as a world leader and major target for terrorism, signed 
an Executive Order (EO) 13636 to Improve Critical Infrastructure 
(CI) Cyber Security and Presidential Policy Directive 21 – Critical 
Infrastructure Security and Resilience (PPD-21). It established 
an All Hazards approach to critical infrastructure security and 
resilience. The cyber security EO establishes a requirement for 
federal agencies to collaborate with their respective industry 
sectors to identify Critical Infrastructure that can be impacted by 
cyber activity.
This initial foray by the federal government has led other 
departments and agencies to take initial steps to address 
the growing issue of cyber threats. The U.S. Department of 
Transportation, Maritime Administration (MARAD), being 
one of those proactive organizations, has recently teamed 
up with the Ship Operations Cooperative Program (SOCP) to 
cooperatively develop Information Systems Security Awareness 
Computer- Based Training (CBT) on cyber threats in the maritime 
environment. This is a first for the U.S. maritime community to 
recognize and take action to assist vessel owners and operators 
with training U.S. mariners on best practices to reduce the 
risks and vulnerability associated with information systems 
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and devices. The newly developed cyber training will give 
mariners a comprehensive overview of the range of threats 
that information systems and devices are subject to, and the 
practices recommended to minimize those vulnerabilities. Best 
practices addressed in the training include a wide range of topics, 
from maintaining network security, to the use of workplace 
computers for private purposes, good password practices, and 
issues concerning the use of social media like Facebook and 
Twitter. The training also addresses issues faced by mariners 
working aboard vessels, such as specifi c log-in policies and rules 
surrounding working with sensitive information. The Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS), through the United States Coast 
Guard (USCG), has also taken to task these growing threats and 
established that American ports, terminals, refineries, vessels and 
supporting industries are vital for the safekeeping of the nation’s 
infrastructure, security and economy. In short, there are as many 
potential avenues for cyber damage in the maritime sector as 
there are cyber systems. While only some cyber-attack scenarios 
in the maritime sector could credibly lead to a transportation 
security incident, we must identify and prioritize security and 
survival at sea.
Security and Survival at Sea
Will the next hacker chess match take place on the high seas, 
involving oil tankers, container ships and other specialized vessels 
transporting approximately 90 percent of the goods moved 
around the world? Many devices are connected online which 
makes them more vulnerable to attack. As the maritime and 
offshore energy industries connect ships and oil rigs to computer 
networks, they expose considerable weaknesses that hackers can 
exploit. For example, it was discovered that pirates off the coast 
of Somalia and other key piracy areas hand pick their targets 
by tracking vessels by AIS, ECDIS and radar. In the oil industry, 
hackers have caused much turmoil, including the tilting of an oil 
rig, causing it to be shut down, as well as accessing networked 
computing systems on another rig and entering malware that 
took trained personnel almost three weeks to clear. Other events 
have included smugglers hacking into networked systems to 
locate containers with drug contraband and cleanly confiscate 
the drugs without being detected. They even went so far as 
attempting to delete shipment data. While data on the extent of 
the maritime industry’s exposure to  cyber-crime is hard to come 
by, a study of a related energy sector conducted by insurance 
companies recently indicated that much of it may be insurable. 
As the energy and oil industry has been targeted for some time, 
statistics indicate that the attacks already have a billion dollar 
impact on the world economy. In the maritime  ndustry, the 
number of known incidents appears to be low due to either the 
companies being unaware of the cyber-attacks or because of the 
desire to keep such news from reaching the press with potential 
detrimental business impact on the company. There are several 
documented reports about hackers compromising maritime 
cyber security. But scientists indicate they have identified security 
issues in three key navigation systems used by mariners: GPS, 
Automatic Identification System (AIS), and the system for viewing 
digital nautical charts Electronic Chart Display and Information 
System (ECDIS). The maritime domain and the energy sector have 
been increasingly turning to technology to improve production, 
while reducing costs and shortening delivery schedules. These 
technologies have now become a liability because the equipment 
became accessible to outsiders. As vessels continue to increase in 
size and the crews diminish in numbers, with the paramount shift 
in vessel operations, ship owners and yards have been adding 
increasing quanitties of automated and remote monitoring 
systems to vessels. This has led to a dilemma, since systems and 
devices on vessels can raise productivity  and improve safety on 
the one hand, while simultaneously giving hackers more systems 
to compromise and control. It is fairly well known that a significant 
portion of computing and network devices are connected to the 
internet using serial ports with poor security. Devices range from 
simple traffic apparatuses such as stoplights, which have been 
proven to have been controlled remotely by hackers, to complex 
items for the oil and gas industry which monitor and control oil 
rigs. It has been reported that some ships switch off their AIS 
systems when passing through waters where pirates are known 
to operate, or fake the data to make it seem they’re somewhere 
else. Some shipping companies are now taking cyber risks as 
true and credible threats and taking necessary measures to beef 
up network and telecommunications security. Recent studies of 
U.S. ports have established that only a handful conducted cyber 
assessments and even fewer developed a response plan. Very 
little federal money has been allocated to the maritime industry 
for cyber security projects or training. This lack of cyber security 
preparation by U.S. ports actually carries over to the shipping 
companies most of which have been discovered to have 
substantial security issues. However, on the bright side, maritime 
computing and network systems have only been compromised 
to a limited extent. This may have something to do with the fact 
that they have not been a high priority and have slipped under 
the hackers’ radar screens unnoticed. What should concern many 
in the maritime industry is that the main ship navigation systems 
including GPS, AIS and ECDIS receive data via radio frequency 
transmission at sea and as such are extremely vulnerable to 
hacking. The recent IMO 2010 Manila Amendments made AIS 
and ECDIS mandatory on larger commercial and passenger 
vessels. This new requirement has increased the need of shipping 
companies for security measures and protocols capable of 
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protecting these devices from intrusion by outside sources. It 
has also been known for some time that ECDIS systems and the 
required software update downloads can be compromised by 
hackers with severe repercussions. This came to light last year 
with the grounding of a U.S. naval vessel in the Pacific Ocean 
where it was reported that the ECDIS charts were incorrect and 
may have had an impact on the accident. A related discovery has 
been the widespread abuse of AIS by the maritime sector. Many 
ships deliberately transmit incorrect AIS position data for security 
reasons in certain parts of the world, including off the coast of 
Somalia; in the Caribbean, smugglers do it to avoid tracking and 
arrest by law enforcement and fishermen for financial gain by 
fishing in forbidden areas. The need for the maritime community 
to understand the principles of information systems and cyber 
security and how they apply to on-board equipment before they 
can implement changes and conduct training so the personnel 
are aware and can act accordingly, is of paramount importance. 
Several areas the maritime industry will need to come abreast 
with are the following:
GPS SPOOFING
There are many recent stories portending to GPS spoofing, 
including the June 2013 project at the University of Texas where 
they employed GPS spoofing as they hacked and manipulated 
the software to disorient the navigation system on a luxury yacht. 
Upon cloaking the device and transmitting the false signal, the 
yacht changed course abruptly when it received the false signal. 
Although this occurred because a system linked to the ECDIS 
handled the steering instead of a helmsman, it still happened. 
This opened up a new issue of the manner of establishment of 
the accuracy and correctness of GPS signals.
eLORAN
GPS has vulnerabilities that pose potential risks. In 2008, 
in response to presidential direction, the U.S. government 
announced that they would establish a nationwide resilient 
terrestrial-based system to augment GPS, going by the name 
of eLoran. This new system would build upon and modernize 
the old Loran-C system, while being less expensive to operate 
and much more accurate. The U.S. is not alone in recognizing 
GPS vulnerabilities; numerous other countries including most 
of Europe, India, Russia and China have installed or will install 
eLoran systems. Unfortunately, the US Department of Homeland 
Security planned to dismantle the remains of the old LORAN-C 
infrastructure even though it can be feasibly used for the new 
eLoran. The good news is that there are currently plans in 
place to resurrect and enhance the old system and turn it into 
a state of the art electronic terrestrial-based system which will 
complement and backup GPS. It was recently reported that 
prominent aids to navigation on the approach to and within San 
Francisco harbor have now been added into the electronic aid 
to navigation (eATON) system. San Francisco has become the 
Beta port in the U.S. as it is the first to begin using this unique 
system. The process is not expensive to implement, as it does not 
require the U.S. Coast Guard to install electronic transmitters on 
the aids to navigation. Due to the fact that the aids to navigation 
are located at fixed positions in the ocean or on land or fixtures 
such as the Golden Gate Bridge, they have their own electronic 
identification assigned to them which is added into the Automatic 
Identification System (AIS). The center span of the Golden Gate 
Bridge is marked by RACON, and bridge towers by eATON digital 
markers. In the San Francisco area, the system is also being used 
in conjunction with reporting points in the Traffic Separation 
Scheme (TSS), including the San Francisco “SF” buoy that serves 
as the embarkation point for the Bar Pilots. It has been reported 
by the USCG that  ATONs will not replace the actual physical 
navigation aids but supplement the existing technology, as well 
as add a virtual layer of aids to navigation in areas in which that 
was previously physically impossible or   impractical. This now 
allows the USCG to place an eATON in the TSS at places which 
were previously too deep, as well as mark a bridge tower that 
was practically needed the most during reduced visibility. This 
technology will eventually allow the USCG to install transmitters 
on buoys to allow prudent mariners to track the actual position of 
the buoys as opposed to where they should be if nautical charts 
were consulted. In a conflicting statement, it was also recently 
reported that certain aids to navigation will be removed off the 
coast of California. This decision was based on the presumption 
that all vessels are equipped with Electronic Chart Display and 
Identification System (ECDIS) in accordance with the IMO 2010 
Manila Amendments which required the system to be installed 
on most vessels (tied to class and size) over a six-year period 
starting as of 2012. This could have disastrous consequences 
because a significant part of the maritime industry, including 
towing, fishing and recreational are not required to have ECDIS. 
Additionally, even for blue water international commercial fleets, 
reliance on ECDIS and GPS alone can be dangerous, especially 
in light of the recent GPS spoofing phenomenon. Prudence and 
situational awareness demand that professional mariners rely on 
visual aids. Otherwise, just try to imagine what would happen in 
case of an electronics failure and loss of ECDIS or both of them on 
a commercial vessel?
ECDIS
ECDIS is believed to have some underlying software security 
vulnerabilities that could have disastrous consequences for ships 
at sea. The basis of ECDIS is a navigation based charting system 
TRANSACTIONS ON MARITIME SCIENCE 183
which uses a computing system to digitally display nautical 
charts along with the exact location and tracking of the ship. 
This is a dramatic alternative and improvement to paper maps 
and the current system of hand plotting positions. ECDIS’s are 
installed on the bridge of a vessel and larger vessels are required 
to have two of them, one as backup. When properly used with 
an ENC chart, they can replace paper nautical maps, which is an 
increasing trend in the maritime industry. The problems do not 
arise when the ECDIS is in standalone mode, but when several 
ECDIS’s are networked together and when data is downloaded 
via an external source, whether through a USB port via a memory 
stick or via the net. Based on the recently released IMO 2010 
Manila Amendments, regulations were implemented which now 
require the EDCIS to be installed on all commercial vessels of a 
certain size. This will slowly eliminate reliance on paper maps 
and take the maritime industry on a journey into the electronic 
world where the next evolution will be the use of portable smart 
devices by navigators. Safeguards need to be put in place for 
ECDIS data updates, as well as for external security breaches 
when used in a networked setting.
AIS
When AIS is operated as intended, it is a useful navigational aid 
that can be instrumental in collision avoidance. As previously 
published, due to the configuration of the system, much of the 
transmitted data can be manipulated or distorted. This was 
recently confirmed by several sources including the Israelis. 
They noticed that vessels transmitting AIS spurious signals 
were nowhere near their actual location and on other occasions 
they also had phantom ships appear that could not be found. 
This system, along with the GPS and the recent spoofing 
episode, needs to be enhanced to include some type of signal 
authentication process so that erroneous signals will not be 
displayed.
Smart Ships
Smart ships are on the horizon and are anticipated to make an 
appearance sometime between 2020 and 2030, going about 
their normal business at sea without a crew and totally monitored 
from shore. Shipyards are already constructing fully sensored 
vessels which can be monitored after delivery and at sea for 
maintenance and servicing purposes. These vessels can take two 
forms and be either autonomous or unmanned. Autonomous 
is defined as a vessel primarily guided by automated on-board 
decision systems but controlled by a remote operator in a shore-
based control facility. Unmanned is one step beyond autonomous 
and is fully controlled from a shore-based control station. Key 
features would be the standard maritime policy of having 
redundant systems and emergency backups on board. Where 
does this new technology take us in the maritime simulation 
world? Possibly as is done with USAF, we will have ship drone 
training and certification. This could tie into the scenario with a 
fully integrated navigation suite of GPS, eLORAN, EATON and a 
digital visual sensor system capable of being fully controlled and 
monitored 24/7/365.
Marine Simulation
Maritime simulation is important as it imitates the operation of 
a real life vessel in a safe environment. The simulation of cyber 
threats and scenarios will allow us to focus on the new cases 
of spoofing and jamming through the mariner’s heavy reliance 
on Radio Frequency (RF) transmissions that can potentially be 
comprised. Simulation can be used to show the possible real 
effects of alternative conditions and courses of action on the 
vessel. Simulation is of utmost importance especially when we 
need to interact in congested waterways, narrow channels, dense 
traffic and with many other restrictions including dangerous 
cargoes. What simulation will allow us to do is introduce many of 
these potential cyber threats from real life environment and let 
the mariner exercise and respond in real time. In developing the 
next wave of maritime education, going beyond Vessel Security 
Officer (VSO) is a logical step, as is the creation of a new position of 
a Vessel Cyber Security Officer (VCSO) in a Maritime Cyber Security 
(MCS) program. This position could be an extension of the VSO 
or a new certification. In either case, having crew members with 
these skill sets who can act as responsible officer(s) on each ship 
is essential. They would be responsible for all levels and details of 
cyber security and defense. In the recently released STCW 2010 
Amendments, the IMO has already proactively moved forward 
by introducing an Electro Technical Officer (ETO) and an Electro 
Technical Rating (ETR). How does the industry move forward 
and get to that logical level of training and preparedness? It 
first needs to review existing maritime simulations to determine 
the equipment and systems we are using. The next step is 
determining the manner of their integration, as well as the built-in 
securities. From this we can embark on a journey of determining 
how cyber threats could attack, destroy or disable the equipment 
… or in the worst-case scenario … take command of it. In the 
end, it is through the awareness training and education that 
mariners will be able to thwart these infiltrations. Another 
source of mariner awareness and training must be the use of 
the Internet and the download of data potentially corrupted by 
viruses, worms, phishing, spoofing and hacking. Regardless of 
whether corruption is due to improper training or lack thereof 
or circumstances or oversight due to fatigue, it must be avoided. 
A similar path applies to the use of vessel email and the threat 
of receiving spear phishing emails purported from reliable 
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sources with clickable links to websites that are fraudulent and 
will take control of your computer back door or install a virus. 
To summarize, as we move forward, we need to incorporate 
into the syllabi of all maritime simulation courses the basics of 
Maritime Cyber Security (MCS) as it is an ever present threat that 
will not go away. It is only by diligence and proper training and 
awareness that seagoing mariners will be prepared and ready to 
take appropriate action when warranted.
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Figure 11.
6-cylinder in-line Wärtsilä 34DF engine.
Source: www.wartsila.com.
The upgraded version of the Wärtsilä 34DF engine is rapidly 
becoming established as an industry standard. The three major 
South Korean shipyards are supporting the use of this engine for 
auxiliary applications in the LNG Carrier segment where dual-fuel 
engines are favoured. South Korea currently has more than 80 % 
of the total order book for LNG tankers, while the Wärtsilä 34DF 
engine has achieved an auxiliary application market share of 
approximately 70 % in this sector.
In the first half of this year Wärtsilä was awarded contracts for 56 
Wärtsilä 34DF dual-fuel auxiliary engines for 14 new LNG Carriers 
being built for four different owners. This means that Wärtsilä has 
already received orders for nearly 100 such engines from these 
three yards since its re-launching with a higher MCR (maximum 
continuous rating) in 2013. All these orders were placed by South 
Korea’s three leading shipyards and the ships are being built for 
European, American and Asian owners.
“The Wärtsilä 34DF dual-fuel engine is a powerful, versatile, and 
efficient engine that is helping shipping move into the gas age. 
The impressive track record of 100 engines sold in a two year 
period speaks for itself. While the success has been universal, 
with contracts from yards and owners globally, the fact that the 
world’s largest shipbuilding nation, South Korea, is increasingly 
opting for the Wärtsilä 34DF is especially gratifying,” says Lars 
Anderson, Vice President, Engine Sales, Wärtsilä Marine Solutions.
The Wärtsilä 34DF engine
The Wärtsilä 34DF was originally introduced in 2008 and was 
based on the successful Wärtsilä 32 engine platform. In 2013 it 
was upgraded to provide 11 percent more power and increased 
efficiency without changing the physical dimensions. The 
upgraded version has a power output range from 3,000 to 10,000 
kW at 500 kW per cylinder.
Wärtsilä in brief
Wärtsilä is a global leader in complete lifecycle power 
solutions for the marine and energy markets. By emphasising 
technological innovation and total efficiency, Wärtsilä maximizes 
the environmental and economic performance of the vessels 
and power plants of its customers. In 2014, Wärtsilä’s net sales 
totalled EUR 4.8 billion with approximately 17,700 employees. 
The company has operations in more than 200 locations in 
nearly 70 countries around the world. Wärtsilä is listed on Nasdaq 
Helsinki, Finland.
As published at www.wartsila.com
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Figure 12.
Mr. Ki-tack Lim (Republic of Korea).
Source: www.imo.org
Mr. Ki-tack Lim (Republic of Korea) elected as IMO 
Secretary General
Mr. Ki-tack Lim (Republic of Korea) was elected the Secretary 
General of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), with 
effect from 1 January 2016, for an initial term of four years.
The vote took place during the 114th session of the 40-member 
strong IMO Council, held 29 June-3 July 2015. The decision of 
the Council will be submitted to the IMO Assembly, which is 
scheduled to hold its 29th session 23 November-2 December 
2015, for approval.
Mr. Lim is currently the President of Busan Port Authority. 
He served as the Republic of Korea’s Deputy Permanent 
Representative to IMO from 2006 to 2009 and was Chairman of 
the Sub-Committee on Flag State Implementation (FSI) from 
2002 to 2004.
As published at www.imo.org
